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Abstract 
 
Secessionist movements are mainly fuelled by religious or historical determinants. 
Nevertheless, it is rare to find such movements that are also not propelled by 
economic factors. This paper deals with the economic factors influencing the 
probability of secession at national or sub-national level. First, the theoretical 
chapter presents the economic analysis of the formation and breaking up of 
countries based on the seminal model of Alesina and Spolaore (1997). I present 
several economic perspectives as boundaries in an ideal world where the number 
and size of states were determined to maximise total benefits minus total costs 
(efficient borders), boundaries determined by voters (democratic outcomes), 
boundaries with economic integration and boundaries in a world of Leviathans 
(rulers as monarchs or dictators). In addition, I expose some extensions where 
some of the main assumptions have been relaxed mainly the nature of borders and 
heterogeneity of jurisdiction. Secondly, the empirical chapter introduces some 
studies regarding the economic factors presented in the theoretical part. Indeed, I 
find strong result of the basic trade-off between heterogeneity and economies of 
scale. Moreover, the empirical results are mixed regarding the link between 
economic globalization and secession. Finally, I found that fiscal decentralisation 
increases the probability of ethnic conflict when there exists disparities in income 
between regions. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
“The entire map of Europe, from the Atlantic coast to the Urals, is being 
redrawn and issues of separation, unification, and the redrawing of 
borders are yet again at the forefront of European concerns. Many of the 
issues raised by this process are primarily of a political, cultural or 
linguistic nature. However, there are also economic considerations that 
bear on this problem” (Bolton and Roland, 1997). 
 
During the last century, a striking increase in the number of new sovereign 
nations and the extent of separatism around the world have raised the interest in 
border rearrangement. Nowadays, we count on a global scale 194 member States 
of the United Nations (against 51 since its creation in June 1945). From a 
historical point of view, there were only forty-six sovereign states in 1900, while 
the rest were under colonial domination. The number of independent states, after 
the Second World War, rose dramatically, leading to seventy-four states in 1948. 
In the fifty years that followed the World War II, decolonization and the break-up 
of the Soviet Union vastly contributed to the increase in the number of states. 
Indeed, the first stage of decolonization, from 1945 to 1954, centred around the 
Asian continent and led several European colonies to become independent. Then, 
the second stage of decolonization, from 1955 from 1966, affected, principally, 
the African continent. Boniface (1998) asserts that the membership to the United 
Nations had tripled between 1945 and 1980.  
 
An important case of secession was, of course, the break-up of the Soviet Union. 
The wish of the Slavic centre to separate from the states at the periphery was the 
consequence of the Soviet Union’s crisis. Indeed, Russia, Ukraine and the three 
Baltic states (states nearest to Western Europe and more industrialized and 
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prosperous, compared to other in the Union) were the most in favour of secession. 
Regarding the Muslim states (the poorest), they wanted to keep the Soviet state 
together, because they had an economic and financial advantage to preserve ties 
with Moscow. Moreover, Boris Yeltsin (elected president of the Supreme Soviet 
of Russia in 1990) asserted that the empire was too expensive for the Slavic states, 
who would have to, henceforth, keep the Muslim states away. In 1991, the Soviet 
Union separated into 15 independent states. 
 
The former Yugoslavia, a multi-ethnic country of roughly 23 million individuals 
in 1989, was a notable case of economic growth, industrial development, and 
progressive trade liberalization. However, this federative country separated into 
several smaller states in the early 1990s. Trying to explain the break-up of 
Yugoslavia, only by historical, political or nationalist factors is not suitable. In 
parallel to the fall of communism in the Eastern Europe, socio-economic 
problems (external debt, foreign trade, labour market, self-management) make the 
breakup clear.  
 
In addition, regions (Wallonia, Catalonia etc.) within states, sometime, desire 
more regional autonomy. Indeed, the case of attempted secession of Quebec from 
the Canada is unique. In 1980, le Parti Québécois (Quebec party) managed the 
provincial government of Quebec and attempted to initiate a referendum, in order 
to separate from Canada. The referendum did not receive enough support, only 40 
per cent of the voters were in favour of secession. In 1994, the Quebec party was 
re-elected to lead the province of Quebec. In 1995, the party tried to initiate a 
second referendum, in order to decide a possible separation from Canada. A 
narrow majority of 51 per cent of voters were against secession. The debate is still 
relevant. 
 
The most famous recent attempt of secession was Scotland’s bid for independence 
from the United Kingdom. The partisan argument was that the cultural identity of 
Scotland, associated with its economic contribution and potential should incite 
voters to support the independence. According to a first survey by the YouGov 
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institute, a small majority (51 per cent) were in favour of secession. Nevertheless, 
the result of the referendum of 19 September 2014 leads to a rejection of the 
independence. Furthermore, other countries or regions can learn lessons from 
Scotland’s bid of independence.  
 
These tendencies have created an extensive body of academic literature regarding 
border formation and break up, and raise important questions like why do states 
break up?  How does size influence the benefits and costs of countries? What is 
the impact of the economic environment, on border redrawing? Do 
decentralisation and federalism increase the desire to secede? Indeed, historians, 
political scientists, philosophers and economists consecrate much time to study 
the formation and breaking up of countries, because the question related to 
secession is at the heart of the debate.  
 
This paper aims to provide, from a theoretical and empirical point of view, a 
synthesis of the economic factors affecting the probability of secession at national 
or subnational level. In other words, my goal is to synthesise the economic 
determinants that contribute to the desire to secede. Although the majority of 
secessionist movements are mainly affected and stimulated by ethnic or religious 
issues, it is rare to find such movements that are also not propelled by economic 
factors. The definition of the term secession according to Bookman (1992) is “the 
act of withdrawing formally from membership in an organization, association, or 
alliance. In its application to international events, the term has come to be 
associated with the breaking of ties (political, economic) by one group of people 
and their territory from the larger political unit of which it was part”. Moreover, in 
order to be consistent, I will use the terms nation, state, country and political 
jurisdiction as synonyms and interchangeably. The terms regions and subnational 
jurisdiction are synonyms and interchangeable as well.  
 
First, I will show how authors model the secession and, more precisely, the 
formation and breaking up of states. Indeed, I will deal with the seminal model of 
Alesina and Spolaore (1997). In their analysis, they consider the boundaries of 
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national country as endogenous and, thus, boundaries are not a fixed characteristic 
of the landscape, but are the endogenous outcomes of decisions by individuals 
who interplay with each other. The starting point of their analysis is the trade-off 
between the size and heterogeneity of the jurisdictions, and how it influences the 
formation and breaking up of states. They investigate different possibilities as 
efficient borders, borders as democratic results, borders in a world of leviathans. 
Moreover, I will expose some limits because some assumptions are restrictive and 
some questions are left open. Then, I will present some extensions of the seminal 
model that reconsider the nature of the boundaries and the heterogeneity of the 
jurisdictions. Indeed, Bolton and Roland (1997) analyses the economic 
determinants of secession, taking boundaries as exogenous. In addition, they 
consider a different kind of heterogeneity that arises from income distribution.  
 
Second, my goal is to highlight some empirical evidence of economic 
determinants that influence secessions. Indeed, I will deal with the basic trade-off 
between the heterogeneity and economies of scale using the analysis of Alesina, 
Baquir and Hoxby (2004). By running a cross-sectional and panel analysis on the 
school district in the US, the authors attempt to explain the causal link between 
the number of school districts and heterogeneity of the jurisdiction (mainly racial 
diversity). Then, I will explore the link between economic globalization and 
secession using the analysis of Sorens (2004). The author analyses the link 
between the growth of secessionist parties and economic globalization controlling 
other factors. Afterwards, I will present, with the help of a gravity model, the 
reverse link that is the impact of political fragmentation and separatist regions on 
international trade using the analysis of Daumal (2008). Finally, I will show an 
empirical analysis of Wakke and Wibbels (2006), where they focus on the link 
between decentralisation and ethnic conflict.  
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Chapter 2 
 
The economics of secession: basic foundations and 
extensions 
 
 
An economic analysis of secession examines some essential insights and results 
concerning efficiency and stability of national boundaries. Indeed, the second 
chapter of this thesis deals with models of formation and breaking up of countries. 
These models suggest different nature of borders and kinds of heterogeneity. The 
first section of this theoretical part deals with the seminal model of Alesina and 
Spolaore (1997). Their model distinguishes by the nature of borders. Indeed, it is 
characterised by endogenous borders. It means that the world has a symmetric 
division where each state has the same size, at equilibrium. Moreover, the 
heterogeneity of the population arises from preferences regarding the public good. 
The second section presents some extensions of the seminal model where some of 
the main assumptions have been relaxed. The model of Bolton and Roland (1997) 
is characterised by exogenous borders. A direct consequence is that the size of the 
state is fixed and not identical, at equilibrium. Moreover, they present a model 
where the heterogeneity of the population arises from difference in the income 
distribution. They concentrate on redistribution conflict and show the principal 
economic and political factors in a secession or unification process.  
 
2.1 A model with endogenous borders 
 
Alberto Alesina and Enrico Spolaore (1997) developed a politico-economic model 
to approach different questions regarding the number and size of countries. They 
study how big a country should be and how big a country will be. This model of 
country formation is based on the following trade-off: economies of scale (a 
benefit in large political jurisdictions) and heterogeneity of preference (a cost in 
large populations). As Barro (1991) said, “we can think of a country’s optimal 
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size as emerging from a trade-off: A large country can spread the cost of public 
goods, over many taxpayers, but a large country is also likely to have a diverse 
population that is difficult for the central government to satisfy”. Therefore, the 
authors think of the equilibrium size of countries as resulting from this trade-off. 
They focus on the comparison between the equilibrium number of countries with 
a world benevolent planner, in a democratic world, and with rent-maximising 
governments. In addition, they use their model to analyse the relation with 
compensation schemes and economic integration. First, I will describe the main 
assumptions and the context of the model. Then I will show how the authors 
compute the equilibrium number of states with a benevolent planner, in a 
democratic world, and in a world of Leviathans. In addition, I will show how the 
equilibrium depends on compensation scheme and the level of economic 
integration. Finally I will expose some limits of the model.  
 
2.1.1 Main assumptions 
 
The authors assume that larger countries prompt some benefits1.  
H1) The cost per capita of a non-rival public good diminishes according to the 
number of individuals in the country. In other words, in larger jurisdictions, we 
observe some economies of scale in the production of public goods.  
H2) The size of the market is dependent of the size of the country. For example, 
in autarky, the two coincide. There will be benefits of increasing returns in the 
size of the countries when we observe some increasing returns in the size of the 
market.  
The authors assume that larger countries prompt some cost as well.  
H3) The population will be more heterogeneous as the political jurisdiction size 
increases. The heterogeneity of the preference implies that the government will 
have some problem to satisfy all the individuals.  
                                                
 
 
1 Alesina and Spolaore (1997) don’t take into account two other benefits: uninsurable shocks are 
more expensive for a smaller country, and security parameters can be a factor of size. 
2 Several historical examples can illustrate the fact that the government is located at the centre. 
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H4) Every nation is characterised by one non-rival public good (fixed quantity) 
the government. The latter is considered as a collection of administrative, judicial, 
economic services and public policies.  
H5) The sum total of the world population is equal to 1, distributed uniformly 
over the segment {0, 1}. In other words, the world can be represented by a line. 
The authors utilize the Hotelling location model and also apply the proximity 
principle, considering equivalence between geographical proximity and 
preferences proximity. Thus, the position of the individuals on the line 
corresponds to both geography and preferences.  
H6) Each political jurisdiction necessitate a single government and the world 
needs at least one government. Consequently, N ≥ 1, where N is the number of 
political jurisdictions in the entire world. Moreover, k represents the cost of each 
government, independent of the size of the countries.  
H7) The location of the government is determined by majority rule (after a 
political jurisdiction is created). The authors apply the median voter theorem.  
H8) The tax is proportional to income in every country, with an identical tax rate 
for each individual. The authors assume that every people have the same tax rate. 
H9) The utility of individuali is  
 
 𝑈! = 𝑔 1− 𝑎𝑙! +   𝑦 −   𝑡!   (2.1) 
 
where  𝑦 is the exogenous income, 𝑡! is the tax and thus (𝑦 − 𝑡!) represents the 
private good. There is no saving, all the income is spent. The parameters 𝑔 and 𝑎 
are positive and represent respectively the maximum utility of the public good 
(when distance between capital and individual is equal to zero) and the loss in 
utility that people bear when the government is at a great distance of their location 
(cost of distance). Furthermore, 𝑙! is the distance between an individuali and his 
government. We remind that geographical and preferences dimensions coincide. 
Thus, 𝑙! measures both distances. 
H10) Individuals are immobile.  
H11) The political jurisdictions borders are endogenous. 
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2.1.2 Results of the model  
 
First, I will present how the authors compute the optimal number of states, by 
solving an optimization under constraints. In other words, a benevolent planner 
aims to reach the greatest level of utility, given the basic trade-off of economies of 
scale and heterogeneity in population. Then, in order to make a comparison with 
the optimal number of states, the authors compute the stable number of states. In 
other words, they describe the voting equilibrium where boundaries are decided 
by a democratic vote. Moreover, the model shows how the equilibrium depends 
on compensation scheme and the level of economic integration. Finally, they 
contrast the Leviathan equilibrium, built on the assumption that rent-maximizing 
governments try to maximize the rents, with the optimal solution.  
 
The world benevolent planner solution 
The authors suppose that a world benevolent planner maximizes the sum of 
individual utilities subject to the production cost of the public good. Thus, he 
solves this optimization under constraints: 
 
 𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑈!! i di = 𝑆!  {𝑔!!!! 1− 𝑎𝑙!" +   𝑦 −   𝑡!"} (2.2) 
  
 Subject to 𝑡!!!!!  = Nk  (2.3) 
 
Where Ui represents the utility of invididuali, 𝑙!" and 𝑡ix are the average distance 
and average tax in country x and 𝑆! is the size of country x and the constraint 
represents the production cost of the public good. In order to minimise the 
average distance (for given N), the social planner locates the government (public 
good) in the middle of the country2.  
                                                
 
 
2 Several historical examples can illustrate the fact that the government is located at the centre. 
Thus, the Brazilian government chose Brasilia as capital, in order to have an opening up and an 
unification of the country. Moreover, in 1998, Kazakhstan president Nursultan Nazarbayev 
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Therefore, the average distance in each political jurisdiction is 1/4 Sx. It means 
that benevolent planner has to solve: 
 
 Min !"!    𝑆!!!!!! + 𝑁𝑘 (2.4) 
 
 Subject to 𝑆!!! = 1 (2.5) 
 
We select countries of same size, s = 1/N, hence the number of countries in the 
world is a positive integer that resolve:  
 
 𝑀𝑖𝑛  𝑔𝑎 4𝑁 + 𝑁𝑘 (2.6) 
 
The first order condition, with respect to N, leads to: 
 
 𝑁∗ =    𝑔𝑎 4𝑘 (2.7) 
 
The result of the equation (2.7) depends on the parameters 𝑔, 𝑎, and the cost of 
governance, k, and, thus, represents the optimal number of political jurisdictions. 
Two important ideas can be derived. 
 
(i) The optimal number of political jurisdictions positively depends on the 
cost of distance (parameter a) and the benefit of the public good 
(parameter g). 
 
(ii) The optimal number of political jurisdictions diminishes with the cost of 
the public good.  
                                                                                                                                 
 
 
decided on a new capital in the middle of the Kazak steppe (Alma-Ata to Astana), in order to 
avoid a possible secession in the northern region where six millions Russians live.  
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After getting the optimal number of nations according to a social planner, I will 
present how the authors analyse the number of nations at the equilibrium in a 
democratic world. 
 
Equilibrium number of nations in a democratic world 
Now, I can change from an optimal world and consider that decisions regarding 
public policy and political borders are taken by a democratic vote. Indeed, the 
authors compare the optimal number of states to one resulting from a democratic 
process. They considered a sequential game, where, in the first step, individuals 
determine the localisation of the public good, and, in the second step, individuals 
vote for or against secession. The authors solve the game by using backward 
induction, leading to a sub-game perfect equilibrium. Taking assumptions number 
seven (H7) and eight (H8) into account, Alesina and Spolaore (1997) consider 
three constitutional rules, in order to define the democratic process that governs 
the number and size of the states (border rearrangement). Indeed, they establish 
Rule A, Rule B and Rule C. 
 
• Rule A means that each person at the border can freely decide which 
country to join.  
• Rule B means that a new state can be created (or a existing state can be 
removed), if the approbation of the majority, in each of the existing state 
concerned by the borders rearrangement, is obtained. There is a B-
equilibrium when no new state is created or removed.  
• Rule C means that a set of individual, within an existing state, have the 
possibility to create a new state, by unanimously voting in support of a 
secession. 
 
A configuration of N states is A-stable, if it is not affected by borders 
rearrangement under rule A.  
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The authors show that an arrangement of political jurisdictions is A-stable, only if 
all political jurisdictions have the same size (necessary condition for stability). 
They show that a configuration of N same sized countries is A-stable, if and only 
if 
 
 𝑁   <    𝑔𝑎 2𝑘 (2.8) 
 
It means that if all political jurisdictions are not equal, the equilibrium is not A-
stable. Indeed, they prove it by perturbing the equilibrium (they increase or 
decrease the size of the political jurisdiction by a small positive number, 𝜀), in 
order to have two bordering countries of different sizes, 𝑠 −   𝜀 and 𝑠 +   𝜀.  
  
 𝑔   1− 𝑎 !!!!    −    !!!! > 𝑔   1− 𝑎 !!!!    −    !!!! (2.9) 
 
which means that 
 
 𝑠 − 𝜀 𝑠 + 𝜀 >   2𝑘 𝑔𝑎  (2.10) 
 
When calculating the limit for 𝜀 tending to zero 
 
 𝑆! >   2𝑘 𝑔𝑎 or 𝑁 <    𝑔𝑎 2𝑘 (2.11) 
 
Then, a configuration of N states is B-stable if there is no majority vote for the 
creation (or the removal) of a new state, under rule B.  
 
One explanation has to be made. Each vote on borders redrawing has to satisfy 
Rule A, and, thus, individuals vote only upon border changes that conduct to 
states of same size. It would be not logical that the result of a vote on a border 
change would not be an equilibrium because some people want to shift borders.  
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The authors propose that an arrangement of same-size countries is in B-
equilibrium, if and only if 𝑁  is the largest integer, smaller than  
 
 𝑔𝑎 2𝑘 (2.12) 
 
and will be the unique B-equilibrium. The authors describe the last proposition by 
focusing on the move from N to 𝑁 + 1  political jurisdictions. We can observe two 
consequences. First, the tax of each individual will augment (because the cost of 
producing public good will be spread over less people), since the new country is 
smaller and secondly, the average distance for each individual will be going down 
(they will be closer to the government). In addition, N to 𝑁 + 1  has to be accepted 
by majority rule if the benefits (because of the smaller distance) are larger than the 
costs (due to increase in taxes). As the median voter theorem is applied, the 
pivotal voter is the individual with the median change in distance, when changing 
from N to  𝑁 + 1, since the change in taxes is the same for everyone. In a similar 
way, the analysis holds for N to 𝑁 −   1. In order to approve these facts, the 
authors try to find at least one political jurisdiction where a majority would vote 
in opposition to a move from 𝑁 + 1 or 𝑁 − 1. They affirm that in each of the 
current country, we observe a majority opposite to the formation of a new 
political jurisdiction if and only if  
 
 𝑁   𝑁 + 1 ≥   𝑔𝑎 2𝑘 (2.13) 
 
This condition confirms that when, in every political jurisdiction, the median 
decrease in the distance from the public good, doesn’t compensate the higher 
taxes due to the number of country augment. Analogously, at least one political 
jurisdiction will refuse the move to N to 𝑁 − 1 nations, if and only if  
 
 𝑁   𝑁 + 1 ≤   𝑔𝑎 2𝑘 (2.14) 
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This condition confirms that, in at least one nation, the decrease in taxes (due to 
the lower number of countries) doesn’t compensate the increase distance from the 
public good.  
 
Finally, a configuration of N states is C-stable if it not affected by borders 
rearrangement under rule C.  
 
The authors determine that a political jurisdiction is C-stable, if and only if 
 
 𝑠   ≤ 6+ 2 𝑘 𝑔𝑎 (2.15) 
 
By deduction,  
 
 𝑁   ≥    !!!!    𝑔𝑎 𝑘 (2.16) 
 
The main results in this under-section can be described as follows: 
 
i. Without compensation transfers within states, efficient borders and 
borders voted democratically would not be disintegrated by unilateral 
secession (in technical terms, both are C-stable and thus are not affected 
by border rearrangement under rule C). 
 
ii. Without compensation transfers within states, efficient borders would lead 
to the creation of a new state with the approbation of the majority in each 
of the existing state concerned by the borders rearrangement (in technical 
terms, efficient borders is not B-stable and thus is affected by border 
rearrangement under rule B). 
 
Rule B is the most restrictive rule because it gives the possibility to individual at 
the periphery (apart from the public good) to vote for the creation of new state 
and, in consequence, the voting equilibrium number of states is greater than the 
optimal number. To sum up, in a voting equilibrium, where a majority of each 
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states’ citizens has to approve on its boundaries and unilateral secession is 
possible, states are smaller and more numerous, compared to an ideal world. 
Moreover, secession leads to inefficiency (smaller sum of everybody’s utilities). 
 
Alesina and Spolaore (1997) argue that with an adapted redistribution to the 
people at the periphery, a social planner could shift from the voting equilibrium to 
optimal one, without making anybody worse off. Then, I will show how the 
authors develop an analysis of possible compensatory schemes.  
 
Compensation schemes  
The authors explore the idea that people at the periphery of the country can be 
compensated (pay lower taxes or receive net positive transfers), in order to avoid a 
number of political jurisdictions bigger than the efficient one. Indeed, individuals 
far from the government (in other words, distant in preference and location 
compared to the individuals in the middle of the country) have to finance the 
public good in the same proportion as individuals are closer in terms of preference 
and geography to the government’s policies. Thus, people at the periphery may 
have a motivation to fragment the actual configuration of political jurisdictions, 
even though it maximises the individual sum of utilities.  
 
Alesina and Spolaore (1997) and (2003) examine the feasibility of compensation 
schemes from the centre to the periphery. First, the authors describe a 
compensation scheme with two parameters q and 𝛾 representing respectively the 
level of compensation and the cost of transfers. If borders are determined before 
compensation scheme, it can leads to a time inconsistency problem. Indeed, when 
a state is created, a majority may always alter tax policies. This leads to wonder if 
compensation scheme can be vote at the same time than the borders are 
determined with an irrevocable engagement. It implies considering multi-issue 
voting on borders, level of compensation, and public good location, at the same 
time.  
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Second, we know from the assumption, individuals are uniformly distributed over 
a line. The authors suppose two countries represented by the figure 2.1. The 
government of the first country and the second country are respectively located at 
1/4 and 3/4. 
 
 
 
Source: Alesina and Spolaore (2003) 
Fig 2.1 – A two-country world 
 
Intuitively, for the first country, the utility of individuals between 0 and 1/8 and 
between 3/8 and 1/2 are less than the utility of individuals between 1/8 and 3/8, 
since everyone has the same taxes. The same logic can by apply for the second 
country. Consequently, it would be feasible to transfers resources from people 
close to the government, to people less close to the government, in order to 
compensate them and to have the optimal size of the country at 1/2. According to 
the Coase theorem, all people would agree if those transfers were without cost (no 
waste as well) and because of that, it would lead to an efficient arrangement of 
borders. In a more realistic view, these transfer schemes lead to distortionary 
taxation. Indeed, we know that “standard public finance theory shows that tax 
distortions grow more than proportionally with the tax rates” (Alesina and 
Spolaore 2003). Therefore, it implies that in sub-national jurisdiction close to the 
middle, the additional tax distortions would more than offset the decrease of tax 
distortions at the periphery. Moreover, tax-transfer schemes has to calculate how 
much to compensate the different individuals and, thus, the government will face 
some problem to know exactly how to compensate regions in a pertinent way. In 
consequence, the efficient size of state may not be sustainable with interregional 
transfers.  
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Economic integration 
The authors examine the link between country size and economic integration, 
whether the country size has an importance for the economic prosperity and the 
influence of the equilibrium number of states when considering economic 
integration.  
 
In autarky, the size of the country coincides with the size of the market. Thus, the 
productivity of the country (Alesina and Spolaore (1997) use the term of per 
capita income or growth) is determined by the size of the country. By contrast, in 
a total open economy, the size of the country does not coincide with the size of 
the market. In consequence, the size of political jurisdictions is impertinent for the 
productivity. This simple analysis highlights the main idea of the authors. Indeed, 
they argue that the stable and the efficient number of countries are rising when the 
economic integration or the degree of international openness increases. The 
intuition is that secession of states is more expensive if it involves smaller 
economies. Nevertheless, the advantages of remaining large are lower if small 
states have the possibility to freely trade and have interaction with other states. 
This implies that the basic trade-off between heterogeneity and size is influenced 
by the trade regime or the interaction with others agents or countries (with an 
open trade, is it more viable for small states to seek independence). Finally, the 
degree of economic integration among states, and their size, can go in the same 
direction. It means that greater economic integration involves smaller states, and 
smaller states will necessitate more economic integration. It is a reinforcing 
process.  
 
The size of nations in a world of Leviathans 
The authors deal with the relationship between democratization and secessions 
and determine whether both terms can go together. Thereby they determine how 
the borders are formed when dictators direct governments. A distinction is made 
between a social planner who maximises the utility of the individuals and 
Leviathans. The latter mean that every decision is taken by rent-maximising 
governments. Moreover, they are concerned only about their own welfare. 
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Following the example of Niskanen, Leviathans look for maximising the size of 
the state.  
 
The central idea is that Leviathans governments prefer large countries (Alesina 
and Spolaore (1997), (2003) use the term empire), to small countries. On the one 
hand, they can take fiscal resources out from greater political jurisdictions. On the 
other hand, they are confronted to the trade-off between economies of scale due to 
the size and cost, due to heterogeneity. Indeed, the probability of an insurrection 
will increase when the size augments and the population become more 
heterogeneous. In consequence, when the world is ruled by Leviathans, what 
would be the arrangement of borders that make the Leviathans’ rent as big as 
possible? They designate 𝛿 “the fraction of population that a dictator has to 
maintain above a certain minimum level of welfare to continue his rule” (Alesina 
and Spolaore, 2003), or in other words, the part of the population that the 
Leviathans care for. They assume that if 𝛿 is equal to zero, Leviathans are left 
without any constraint and would want to supply the least possible quantity of 
public service at a maximum tax level. If the parameter 𝛿  equals to one, 
Leviathans will have to assure a minimum level of welfare to all individuals, even 
the minorities (group without advantages), in order to retain sovereignty and 
avoid insurrection. In addition, the probability that a Leviathan government is 
insensitive to the welfare of its population, is low. Furthermore, a number much 
under 𝛿 equal to 1/2 signify that Leviathans are true dictators. For example, the 
high-ranked representative of the communist party in the erstwhile Soviet Bloc. 
 
I will show the relationship between borders and 𝛿 in which extent borders rely 
upon 𝛿. Indeed, the authors argue that the number of political jurisdictions when 
Leviathans rule is increasing in 𝛿 . The insight is the following: when the 
parameter 𝛿  is low, Leviathans face nearly no constraints and ignore the 
heterogeneous preferences. It desires to benefit of economies of scale. It means 
that rent-maximising governments prefer to govern larger political jurisdictions 
(empire), even though individuals are far away from the government and get low 
utility. In an opposite direction, the consequence of an increase in 𝛿 conducts 
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Leviathans to take more into account heterogeneity of preference, than economies 
of scale. Indeed, if they govern larger countries, they will lose some gain. Thus, 
they will approve secession of regions rather than face an insurrection or some 
expensive compromises, such as reducing taxes. Democratic Leviathans will 
govern smaller states than the optimal one. In order to be more precise, when 
Leviathans govern the world, for 𝛿 lower than 1/2, the number of states is lower 
than the optimal number. On the other hand, when 𝛿 is higher than 1/2, the 
number of states is bigger than the optimal number. By means of the intuition 
above, the size of states with Leviathans is bigger than in the democratic world. 
Indeed, Leviathan boundaries coincide with democratic boundaries, when 𝛿 is 
equal to one. In a nutshell, the worlds of dictators are more synonymous with 
inefficiently large states, whereas democratization is associated with 
fragmentation of empire and secessions.  
 
2.1.3 Limits of the model 
 
I will now introduce some limits of the model of Alesina and Spolaore (1997). 
Indeed, we observe that the match of the model, with the reality, will greatly 
depend on the assumptions. It should be noted that some assumptions are 
particularly restrictive. 
 
First, according to Graziosi (2004), a direct consequence of endogenous border is 
a symmetrical sharing out of the world where political jurisdictions have the same 
size at the equilibrium while exogenous borders set the size of the countries that 
are not identical at the equilibrium. In other words, sizes of the states are 
exogenous, considered as heritage of the past. In a real world, it is obvious that 
the different countries have different size. Moreover, endogenous borders affect 
the vote modality. Indeed, they coincide with the localisation of the individual 
that is indifferent between two adjacent political jurisdictions. Concerning 
exogenous borders, secession can be decided by a majority vote and, thus, the 
individuals in the political jurisdiction are split into the separatist and the partisan, 
for a unified country.  
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Second, in the utility function described above, the incomes are supposed to be 
exogenous. The authors don’t take into account differences between individuals 
regarding the income. Therefore, this means that they disregard the question 
concerning the redistributive role of the government. Moreover, in order to 
establish the equilibrium number of nations, we saw that an important factor is the 
degree of heterogeneity in the population. Thus, if we consider change in income, 
the degree of heterogeneity might be modified.  
 
Third, the individuals are supposed to be immobile. This supposes that tax 
competition and equalization does not make sense anymore even though these 
questions are at the heart of fiscal federalism. In addition, nowadays, in a world 
more and more globalised and integrated, individuals have the possibility to cross 
over to other the countries. However, According to Buchanan and Faith (1987), 
secession is an alternative to “vote with their feet”, as soon as it is impossible or 
expensive to migrate (transport cost, linguistics barriers). Moreover, Drèze (1993) 
and Dion (1996) assert that regions concerned by secessionist movements have a 
strong identity slightly different compared to the national identity. It leads to a 
developed regionalism particularism (culture, language) that slow down the 
geographical migration. Then, others authors like Faini, Galli, Gennari and Rossi 
(1997) describe the lack of mobility as an inefficiency of the labour market and 
the high costs of the mobility. Moreover, due to the uniform density in the model, 
it is impossible to find a polarized society. In other terms, if we remove the 
correspondence between geographical and preferences dimensions, we leave the 
question of geographical mobility open. This leads to take into account the 
possibility of presence of ethnic or cultural minorities. Indeed, ethnic minorities 
(ethnic groups) are widely represented in the World. Fearon’s list (2003) 
characterises 709 ethnic minorities.  
 
Fourth, the central government does not supply all the different public goods and 
is not in charge of all policies. In reality, the central government transfers some 
responsibilities to the inferior level as subnational jurisdiction or regions. 
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However, the degree of power transferred is slightly different across regions. In 
their seminal paper, they consider only one level of government. 
 
Finally, the spending regarding an eventual military force within the country, and 
military menace coming from an external sources is not considered in their model. 
It is obvious that this will affect the quantity of the public good.  
 
2.2 A model with exogenous borders 
 
This section proposes some extensions related to the groundbreaking model of 
Alesina and Spoalore (1997). I will reconsider some fundamental assumptions of 
the model. Indeed, while Alesina and Spolaore (1997) determined the endogenous 
formation of states, others economists focus on the secession of states, taking 
borders as exogenous, in order to avoid a purely symmetric world representation 
and matching the reality more closely. Thus, Bolton and Roland (1997) attempts 
to analyse the main economic and political factors of the processes of secession 
and unification of democratic nations, taking border as a heritage of the past. 
Moreover, the nature of the heterogeneity considers the difference in income 
among individuals, while Alesina and Spolaore (1997) consider that the 
heterogeneity comes from the preference in the public good. Thus, it implies some 
regional conflict regarding redistribution.  
 
Their starting point is to argue that secession is never desirable. A unified nation 
can escape from duplication cost (defence, law) and free trade between sub-
national jurisdictions is possible. However, the advantage of unification is not 
equally distributed among all individuals and, thus, there exists, in each 
democratic subnational jurisdiction, some winners as well as losers from 
secession. Their model deals with the conditions under which the majority of 
winners are in favour of secession or unification. The authors focus on “regional 
conflicts over fiscal policy arising from differences in income distribution across 
regions” (Bolton and Roland, 1997). In others words, the money collected and 
redistributed by the government is a source of conflict between citizens.  
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2.2.1 The main assumptions and results of the model 
 
I will present the main assumptions and results of the model of Bolton and Roland 
(1997) and draw parallels with the model of Alesina and Spolaore (1997). First, 
the authors consider two regions A and B with exogenous borders while Alesina 
and Spolaore (1997) determined the borders as endogenous. Moreover, 
individuals differ in income, but not in preferences over types of governments (as 
in Alesina and Spolaore (1997)). Second, the government has to provide the 
public good (lump sum transfer) or is characterised by a role of redistribution of 
income financed by linear income tax schedules determined through voting. Thus, 
the aim of taxation is pure redistribution. Third, Equilibrium tax rate with a 
majority vote represents the median income voter’s favourite tax rate. Fourth, the 
income distribution is not the same in each region. A median income voter in 
region A has a different favourite tax rate compared to a median income voter in 
region B. Moreover, the equilibrium in a unified state does not correspond with 
the equilibrium in each region. Fifth, the trade-off is the following: efficiency 
advantage of a unified state against the advantage of having an income 
redistribution policy closer for a majority in the region.  Finally, there is factor 
mobility inside the regions (not across regions) and secession arises when a 
majority of voters support the separation in at least one region.  
 
The authors considered a sequential game, where, in the first step, individuals 
determine the redistribution policy (tax rate), and, in the second step, individuals 
vote for or against secession. The authors solve the game by using backward 
induction, leading to a sub-game perfect equilibrium. In order to determine when 
secession arises at the equilibrium, the authors compare the outcome of the 
median voter under secession and under unification. If the outcome under 
secession of at least one median voter is greater than the outcome under 
unification, secession will happen. Thus, the authors show three important effects 
defining the choice of secession of the regions.  
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(i) The political effect is the difference in the preferred fiscal policy between 
median voter in region i and the median voter of the rest of the country (in 
the unified state). 
 
(ii) The efficiency effect represents the impact of efficiency loss. The greater 
the efficiency loss from secession, the lower the advantage from secession 
to the median voter in region i. 
 
(iii) The tax-base effect is the difference between the mean income in the 
region and the unified state. When the mean income is smaller in the 
region than in the unified state, this leads to a supplementary cost of 
secession for region i due to smaller tax base. Inversely, it leads to a tax 
advantage from secession.  
 
Bolton and Roland (1997) define a first simple result representing the concept of 
government closer, in term of redistributive policy, to the individuals. Indeed, 
with a similar per capita income in both region and no efficiency losses, secession 
would always arise at the equilibrium in a democracy. In other words, the political 
effect is centrifugal because, ceteris paribus, any regions opt for secession in order 
to realize the preferred fiscal policy.  
 
Consequently, the existence of a political effect explains the situation where 
poorer regions desire to secede, as well as richer regions. They both want to be 
closer to the favourite policy. Indeed, the majority in poorer regions are in support 
of secession, in order to establish a higher tax rate and thus having more 
redistribution. Inversely, the majority in richer regions are in support of secession 
in order to reduce the tax rate and thus having less redistribution. Moreover, when 
considering a small efficiency loss, the authors argue that it is conceivable that a 
majority in at least one subnational jurisdiction may benefit from secession in 
spite of an efficiency loss for each secessionist subnational jurisdiction.  
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Finally, the authors assume the perfect factor mobility (capital and labour). It 
means that each person can decide the location of their capital or labour (factor 
endowments), wherever they want. They consider that two regions have a 
different tax rates and observe, in the new game, how perfect factor mobility acts 
on the final outcomes. Assume, for example, that tax rate in region A is lower 
than in region B. This leads individuals who earn the highest income in region B 
want to move in region A. Thus, tax revenues in region B are lower and there is a 
decrease in redistribution. This implies that individuals who earn low income in 
region B also want to move to A, and so on. In consequence, the authors propose 
a second result as follows. Any equilibrium under perfect factor mobility leads to 
the same tax rate in region A and B, and, therefore, there is a harmonization of the 
tax rates and the union is always preferred to secession. 
 
To conclude, the economics of secession is often presented in term of cost-benefit 
analysis. In the theoretical cases described above, the heterogeneity of the country 
(in term of preferences over public goods or in term of income redistribution) is 
an important factor of secession.  
 
Bolton and Roland (1997) emphasise on the redistributive and tax aspect. They 
consider the borders of national country as given, as a heritage of the past. Two 
regions having the same income per head and same disparity level would have the 
same tax preferences and thus no encouragement to secede. Inversely, difference 
in term of income per head or in redistributive policy would lead to secession.  
 
Others economists as Alesina and Spoalore (1997) emphasize more on spatial 
heterogeneity where the physical distance between periphery and the centre who 
decide the location of the public good and the quantity. A public good is 
assimilated to a government. His location satisfies the closest individual and 
dissatisfies the most apart. They consider the borders as endogenous outcomes of 
choices by individuals who interact with each other while pursuing their goals 
under constraints. These authors argue that borders are not fixed characteristics of 
the landscape, to be treated as given, but they are affected by the choices and 
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interactions of peoples and groups. When individuals can decide democratically 
whether to form a larger political country or secede from existing polities, voters 
with preferences that are remote from the central government bear higher 
heterogeneity costs. Thus, they may perceive that the heterogeneity cost are 
bigger than the economies of scale and thus make secession. This democratic 
outcome may lead to equilibrium with to many countries.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Empirical evidence of economic factors influencing 
secession 
 
 
The previous chapter presented the manner to model the economic of secession 
and formation of political jurisdictions. The purpose of the third chapter of this 
thesis is to introduce empirical studies presenting economic factors influencing 
secession. Buchanan and Faith (1987) highlight the fact that secession may be a 
“road not travelled”. This famous sentence means that breakups are relatively 
infrequent facts and each of them present specific characteristics. Indeed, 
secession arises given different circumstances like following a vote or after a civil 
war. However, strong demand for autonomy (even menace of secession) 
influences the government behaviour. Therefore, economists, political scientists 
have some trouble to analyse empirical evidence regarding secession. Moreover, 
they tend, sometimes, to focus on subnational jurisdictions. The aim of this third 
chapter is to test different economic factors having an impact on secession. 
Indeed, I will first deal with the basic trade-off between economies of scale and 
heterogeneity of preferences. Alesina, Baqir and Hoxby (2004) give attention to 
analysing the link between the number of jurisdictions (school districts in the US) 
and the heterogeneity of the jurisdiction (racial diversity), using the model of 
Alesina and Spolaore (1997) as a base. Then, I will show some empirical evidence 
regarding economic globalization and secession using the analysis of Sorens 
(2004). He deals with the evolution of secessionist parties in democratic states and 
economic globalization, controlling other economic determinants. Then, Daumal 
(2008) tries to assess the impact of fiscal federalism and separatist regions, on 
international trade. Finally, I will present the effect of decentralisation (including 
intergovernmental transfers) and federalism on secession. Bakke and Wibbels 
(2006) provide a compelling attempts to evaluate the relation between 
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decentralisation and ethnic conflict, taking into account the differences between 
federal states.  
 
3.1 The basic trade-off between economies of scale and 
heterogeneity of preferences 
 
Alesina, Baquir and Hoxby (2004) empirically test the basic trade-off between the 
benefit of large states (economies of scale) and the cost of heterogeneity of 
preferences using data at local level in the US. They argue that focusing on local 
jurisdictions is informative because they are more concerned about their own 
rights, there exists a greater number of local jurisdictions and they change very 
often, compared to greater jurisdictions. The authors focus on different kind of 
heterogeneity like race, ethnicity, religion, income and age. This section is 
organized as follows. I will first present the main variables and data. Then, I will 
present the empirical strategies and results, mainly a panel analysis on school 
districts.  
 
3.1.1 Main variables and data 
 
The theoretical model describes a simple model of jurisdictions (county) built on 
Alesina and Spolaore (1997). Indeed, they consider a county with a total 
population M. There are T types of peoples established at a distance h from each 
other, m represents the mass of people corresponding to each type, thus 𝑀 = 𝑚𝑇. 
Moreover, the authors add the notion of density 𝑑 = 𝑚/ℎ. One important aspect 
is the representation of their theoretical model in a single dimension. They argue 
that distance between people represents a general calculation of the difference 
between people (income, geographic, taste etc.). However, people are dissimilar 
on several dimensions. Their aim is to find the number of school districts into 
which the county is divided. In a similar way than Alesina and Spolaore (1997), 
the authors resolve a maximisation (sum of individual utilities) under constraint 
(school budget) and find that the school is located in the middle of each school 
district with N optimal number. 
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Up to this point, they consider all kind of heterogeneity into a single dimension. 
In order to deduce results with empirical significance, the authors have to relax 
this hypothesis. When they add the density in their theoretical model, they find 
that when density increases, heterogeneity of preferences decreases. However, 
nowadays, individuals, in cities, live very close to each other (high density) and 
individuals are very different in term of income, preferences or race. As a 
consequence, a single dimension model is not suitable and the authors will use a 
bi-dimensional model where the coincidence between preference heterogeneity 
and geographical distance is disconnected. Thus, they separate each county into J 
parts with a mass of population (mj) and types of individual (Tj). The authors 
argue that it would be optimal to choose N equally sized school districts with 
different density. The solution is: 
 𝑁 =    !!    !"!!   ( 𝑇!    𝑚!!!!! )   (3.1) 
 
The authors deduce from the theory their empirical strategy in logs as: 
 ln𝑁 =    !! ln ℎ +   !! ln𝑔 +   !! ln 𝑎 −   !! ln 𝑘 + ln 𝑇!!!!! 𝑚!      (3.2) 
 
where N denotes the number of school districts into which a county is divided, h 
represents the distance between the different types of individual, g and a are 
respectively parameters that capture the benefit of public good and the disutility 
of distance, 𝑘 corresponds to the fixed cost of school and thus captures the 
economies of scale and, finally, the sum expresses each fragment of the county (j) 
occupied by a mass of individual 𝑚! and 𝑇! types of individuals. In other words, it 
represents the total population in a fragmented way. Regarding the last term of 
equation (3.1), its purpose is to separate the coincidence between preference 
heterogeneity and geographical distance, in order to avoid the single dimension 
problem explained above.  
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The equation above means that the number of school districts should depend on 
(i) measures of heterogeneity of preference (which is the aim of their study), (ii) 
measures of benefit of the public good, (iii) measures of fix cost of school and (iv) 
measures of density and size of county. In other words, the number of School 
Districts is the dependent variable, and (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) are the independent 
variables.  
 
Proxy variables like racial, ethnic or religious fragmentation indices and 
calculation of income inequality express the main variable of interest, the 
heterogeneity of preference. 
 
The benefit of public good (g) or the degree to which individuals want the public 
good is represented by county’s mean income, share of adults with a high school 
degree, college degree, share of individuals aged 65 or older, and, in some 
conditions, industry employment share.  
 
A good proxy for the measure of fixed cost (recall 𝑘 detects the economies of 
scale) is, according to Hoxby (2000), quoted by Alesina, Baquir and Hoxby 
(2004), natural barriers like streams. Indeed, he demonstrates that domains with 
more streams will have more jurisdictions, ceteris paribus. In addition, state 
indicators are included. 
 
The last term of the equation (3.2) necessitate a “measure of density and measure 
of total population in parts of the county with different population density” 
(Alesina, Baquir and Hoxby, 2004). Because of this, they use a multivariate taylor 
expansion. Thus, the authors propose a collection of population and density 
variables that determine the baseline for a new jurisdiction formation within the 
county. They suggest four classifications of density for each county, which are 
low, medium, high and very high density.  
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I will now present the different data that have a county-level dimension. They are 
partly originate from the US Censuses of Population and from 50 other sources3.  
 
• Income heterogeneity is calculated with the Gini coefficient (similar 
results with Theil index, coefficient of variation and ratios of income 
deciles). 
 
• Index of racial heterogeneity is the probability that two random people in a 
county are associated with different races (according to the Census of 
Population, race defines five categories: white non-Hispanic, black non-
Hispanic, Asian and Pacific Islander, Native American, and Hispanic). 
Mathematically, this can be represented as “𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒 = 1− (𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝!)!! ” 
where group denotes the share of peoples associating to race i. According 
to the authors, their sample represents 98 per cent of whites in the 
counties. Therefore, if “heterogeneity” increases, the “number of whites” 
will decrease. 
 
• Index of ethnic heterogeneity represents two different indexes: index of 
whites and Hispanics. They correspond to the probability that two random 
white (Hispanic) persons in a county are associated with different primary 
ancestry groups (with equal dissimilarity). For example, the Scottish are 
combined with the English, into the British.  
 
• Religious heterogeneity is represented by data on attachment to 17 major 
Judeo-Christian groups.  
 
In their analysis, the authors interpret the results in term of standard deviation 
because most of the variables do not have unities (for instance, the equation 
“race” presents no unity).  
                                                
 
 
3 Regarding descriptive statistics for counties, see Table 1 in Alesina, Baquir and Hoxby (2004). 
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3.1.2 Empirical strategies and results 
 
The authors first run a least-squares estimation of cross-sectional data (data 
collected at the same point of time). They use a specification log-log, therefore, 
the dependent/independent variables are in logarithm (in the equation), in order to 
interpret the coefficients as elasticity. They employ data from 1990 for the cross-
sectional analysis, because it was the most complete year in terms of available 
data. However, the results will not make clear if there exists a causal link between 
the number of School Districts and the explanatory variables. The causal 
mechanism which the trade-off operates (Alesina, Baquir and Hoxby, 2004) is 
thus not yet defined.  
 
In order to attempt to solve the problem of causal link or in other words whether 
the population heterogeneity have an effect on the number of jurisdictions or is it 
an other explanation, the authors run a regression with panel data. This method 
requires observations for more periods (panel of counties). In our case, the authors 
employ a panel of counties from 1960 to 1990. “By studying changes in the 
dependent variable over time, it is possible to eliminate the effect of omitted 
variables that differ across entities but are constant over time” (Stock and Watson, 
2012). Indeed, the authors argue that with this method, many idiosyncratic 
characteristics of counties are not anymore considered as omitted variables. They 
use a specification log-log plot and, therefore, the dependent/independent 
variables are in logarithm (in the equation) in order to interpret the coefficients as 
elasticity. 
 
First, they investigate if a change over time in heterogeneity leads to a change 
over time in number of jurisdictions. However, during this period, an 
augmentation of the number of jurisdictions were extremely infrequent. Thus, the 
authors assess if in more heterogeneous counties, consolidation was taking 
considerable time. Their main result is the following: counties that faced an 
augmentation in racial heterogeneity have a lower reduction in term of number of 
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jurisdictions. Nonetheless, this result is a necessary condition but not sufficient for 
a causal link.  
 
Thus, the authors need changes in heterogeneity that are credibly exogenous in 
order to find the most robust evidence. Therefore, they employ shocks to 
heterogeneity during the World War I and World War II. Indeed, during this time, 
we observe a massive migration of Black individuals in the north (perturbing4 a 
small and discernible number of counties). Moreover, several counties (with 
industrial firms as well) were not perturbed because they did not produce any war 
goods. Their goal is to designate a number of counties perturbed by the black 
migration, and confront them to ex ante similar (in term of population, 
urbanization and initial share of black population) counties that were not 
perturbed.  
 
Table 3.2 presents the panel analysis results. Column 1 presents the first 
regression, using exogenous shocks to heterogeneity during World War I, and 
column 2 shows the second regression using exogenous shocks to heterogeneity 
during World War II.  
 
                                                
 
 
4 An increase of at least two percentage point in the black share of the population. 
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The main significant result is the change in the racial index during World War I 
and II. Indeed, they obtained that an increase in the change in racial heterogeneity 
(in the counties affected by the massive migration) raised the number of school 
districts by 5 per cent, after World War I and by 4 per cent, after World War II.  
 
In a nutshell, the authors find that racial heterogeneity had a positive impact on 
the number of school districts in the US and, thus, the basic trade-off is an 
important factor of size and number of local governments. In other words, 
individuals put more importance in the will of avoiding racial heterogeneity than 
benefit from economies of scales. Moreover, they discover less strong result 
regarding income heterogeneity. However, the trade-off between income 
heterogeneity and economies of scales is present. Finally, they obtain less 
evidence regarding the other proxy variables (ethnic and religious). 
 
3.2 Empirical analysis regarding the link between economic 
globalization and secession 
 
A state’s market size corresponds with its domestic size only if the state’s 
economy is perfectly integrated domestically but closed to the world. From the 
opposing point of view, in a total economically integrated world, market size of 
state is larger than its political size and represents the world. However, perfect 
economic integration among country is rarely seen in the real world. Some 
economists as Portes and Rey (2000) characterise the effects of borders in 
financial markets and consider the size of them to information costs. His argument 
is that economic costs of small states decline as economic integration augments. 
Thus international openness decreases the benefits of large political size. This 
may increase the demand for political autonomy.  
 
Several economists and political scientists attempt to test the link between 
economic globalization and political autonomy. Indeed, I will first present the 
paper of Sorens (2004) that deals with the relation between the determination and 
evolution of secessionist parties in democratic countries, and economic 
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globalization controlling other determinants. Sorens (2004) associate secessionist 
parties with a wish to favour independence within a states or union as the Scottish 
National Party (in the European Union) or le Parti Québecois (in Canada).  
 
Secondly, while Alesina et al. (2000), Graziosi (2006) analyse the repercussions 
of economic integration on political fragmentation, I will present the paper of 
Daumal (2008) where she attempts to empirically to analyse the opposite effect. 
Indeed, by running panel data estimation with a gravity model, she tries to test 
two hypotheses whether separatist regions (Quebec, Catalonia etc.) and political 
fragmentation in federalism system foster greater trade openness.  
 
3.2.1 Secessionism and economic globalization 
 
Sorens (2004) analyses the relation between secessionism and phenomenon that 
change over time (economic globalization), controlling other economic factors in 
democratic states. Indeed, this analysis does not consider cross-sectional factors 
of secessionism, but rather over-time factors of secessionism. The author 
considers three regressions (Tobit for all regions, least squares for 15 regions and 
ordered Probit for the autonomy) with fixed-effect specifications. This study takes 
into account data from 1980 to 2000.  
 
Hypotheses  
Hypothesis 1. Economic globalization increases secessionism. 
The main idea is that minority or regions (with secessionist party) may prefer to 
breakup as international openness and economic integration increase. Moreover, 
there is a reinforced process between globalization and secession. Both strengthen 
each other.  
 
Hypothesis 2. Higher ratio of Regions GDP per capita compared to countrywide 
GDP ratio per capita have a greater probability to favour secessionist parties.  
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The author presumes that high capacity regions will have to pay more in taxes 
compared to the government expenditure they can actually enjoy. Thus 
individuals favour secessionist party within high capacity regions. 
 
Hypothesis 3. Political environment (more regional autonomy and existence of 
regional election) may have a positive or negative impact on secession.  
The idea is that if the central government gives more power to a region, the 
majority of the inhabitants within it will not anymore vote for secessionist parties, 
because they feel satisfied of the agreement. Though, regions may be disappointed 
because they did not receive the promised autonomy and, in consequence, 
secession may benefit. 
 
Methodology and variables 
In order to evaluate the hypotheses mentioned above, the authors run three 
regressions. The first one takes into account all the regions5 with secessionist 
parties and without secessionist parties. Moreover, the regression considers a 
Tobit estimation because the explained variable cannot take a value under zero 
(the explained variable is censored).  
 
The second regression takes into account 15 regions6 where secessionist parties 
exist (regions without secessionist parties are not considered). The regression 
consider a least square estimation.  
 
For the first two regressions, the dependent variables are built from secessionist 
party vote share. The author argues that secessionist party vote share presents 
some benefit. Indeed, the variable offers important distinction among regions and 
over time, thus it can be interpreted and compared between subnational 
jurisdictions. Moreover, the variable is continuous and measurement error is 
below the normal level. For a well-established range of countries, voting for a 
                                                
 
 
5 See Sorens (2004) pp.737-738 for the regions concerned.  
6 See Sorens (2004) p. 734 for the regions concerned. 
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party advocating secession is a suitable method of asserting autonomy or 
secession. LNVOTE represents the dependent variable in the Tobit regression 
considering all the regions. It can be characterised as: 
 𝐿𝑁𝑉𝑂𝑇𝐸 = ln  (3+ 𝑉𝑂𝑇𝐸)    (3.3) 
 
VOTE represents the dependent variable for the least square regression of the 15 
regions. Finally, DAUTO represents the dependent variable for the ordered Probit 
regression with the increase in the regional autonomy as the dependent variable. 
 
The author utilises fixed-effects specification that consider dummy variables. 
Their aim is to control the invariant factors that induce alteration in secessionist 
vote share across regions. In other words, fixed-effects control omitted time-
invariant variables. It is important to capture significant factors that differ year to 
year, in order to forecast change in secessionist votes over the period.   
 
Sorens (2004) characterises the main important economic explanatory variable 
(economic globalization) as the overall openness of the international system as 
world merchandise exports divided by world production. The author 
approximately simplifies the term of economic globalisation as the international 
trade between two countries. According to the Foreign Policy Globalization 
Index, it exists other interesting way to measure globalization as economic 
integration involving financial flows, political engagement or information 
technology. The expected sign of the economic globalization (GLOB) is positive.  
 
Regarding the control variable, GDPRATIO is measured by regional per capita 
GDP, divided by nationwide per capita GDP. The expected sign is positive. The 
control variable called regional election (PROVELEC) is a dummy variable that 
can take the result of 0, if there are regional elections, or 1, if there are 
countrywide elections. The expected sign is positive. The control variable called 
regional autonomy (DAUTO) is represented by the change of PROVAUTO 
between two elections. The latter represents a compound variable that calculate 
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several aspects like elected executive, legislative power, administrative power and 
fiscal autonomy7. The expected sign is negative.  
 
Results 
 
 
                                                
 
 
7 See Sorens (2004) for a complete description of the composite variable PROVAUTO. 
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The analysis of the persistence and evolution of secessionist vote share in 
democratic countries, during 1980 to 2000, provides the following results. The 
first column enumerates the results for the regression involving all the regions. 
The second column enumerates the results for the regression involving 15 regions 
with secessionist parties and, finally, the last column enumerates the results where 
the regression analyses whether central government gives more political 
autonomy to regions with secessionist parties, compared to regions without 
secessionist parties. 
 
Hypothesis 1. 
Concerning the regression involving all regions, we find no statistically 
significant result for the variable economic globalization. However, regarding the 
regression involving 15 regions with secessionist parties, we find statistically 
significant (from zero at 99 per cent confidence level) result and, thus, economic 
globalization is positively correlated with the evolution of secessionist vote. 
However, the author neglects the term of economic globalization. He does not 
consider the financial integration. Indeed, it is an important factor for making a 
country more efficient and competitive and, ultimately, for improving to 
sustainable economic growth. For example, the EU’s financial integration has 
been an important process during the last decade. The Catalonia in Spain has to 
consider the financial markets, financial institutions (bank, central bank) in the 
context of secession. The monetary aspect is a key component. The evolution of 
the exchange rate (more precisely the new currency) after secession will depend 
on the EU’s financial system and will imply some adaptation costs. Moreover, in 
the short term, absence of credibility of the new currency and a state of 
uncertainty regarding the economy may increase the interest rate and thus weaken 
the financial system.  
 
Hypothesis 2. 
Regarding the regression involving 15 regions with secessionist parties, we find 
strong evidence (statistically significant from zero at 99 per cent) that relative 
regional GDP is positively correlated with secessionist vote growth. The idea 
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behind this result is that high capacity regions may avoid to pay for low capacity 
regions. For example, Catalonia has a GDP per inhabitants higher than the mean 
in Europe.  
 
Hypothesis 3. 
Regarding both regressions (all regions and 15 regions), the result is statistically 
significant and, thus, existence of regional election increases secessionism. 
Regarding the ordered Probit regression involving regional autonomy as the 
dependent variable, we find strong evidence (statistically significant from zero at 
99 per cent) that central governments give more autonomy to regions including 
greater secessionist vote share, from 1980 to 2000. The author asserts that nations 
with subnational jurisdictions involving secessionist parties are more likely to 
engage in favour of decentralisation.  
 
An additional information is that the R-squared for the 15 regions is 35,4 per cent. 
It means that approximately 36 per cent of the variance in secessionist vote share 
is explicated by the independent variables. This result holds attention in the sense 
that party strategy, popularity of current parties, coalition, media and other non-
measured determinants are not taken into account. 
 
To sum up, we discover evidence that secessionism augments with the growth of 
globalization only in regions that already have secessionist parties. However, the 
definition of the term economic globalisation has to be taken with a pinch of salt. 
The authors find strong support that relative regional economic growth increases 
secessionism. Finally, secessionist regions have a greater probability to get 
autonomy than non-secessionist regions. This means that central government 
believe that autonomy may reduce the effect of electoral secessionism.   
 
3.2.2 Separatist regions promote trade openness 
 
Alesina et al. (2000) argue that economic integration brings about political 
disintegration, due to a decrease in the economic costs of smallness and secession.  
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Moreover, Casella and Feinstein (2002) point out that the implementation of a 
nation into worldwide markets could lead to political disintegration. Although 
several economists attempt to assess the effect of international openness on 
secession or political fragmentation, Daumal (2008) deals with the opposite link. 
Therefore, she empirically tests with the help of a gravity model (i) the impact of 
political fragmentation (namely federalism) on trade openness and whether (ii) 
separatist regions of federal countries encourage international trade.  
 
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1. Political fragmentation leads to market fragmentation and thus to 
greater trade openness. 
The idea of this hypothesis can be described as follows. One important principle 
of federalism is that there is no subordinate link between the central government 
and subnational jurisdictions, there is a share of the competence rule by a federal 
constitution. Moreover, in federations, subnational jurisdictions have a certain 
degree of power regarding taxes or regulations and can implement inter-regional 
trade barriers (norms, taxes, quantitative restrictions). Thus, national market 
fragmentation results from inter-regional barriers. Hence, Daumal (2008) asserts 
that unitary countries are more integrated within the country than federal 
countries. Therefore, federal countries, at a higher level, integrated in the 
worldwide economy. In other words, the international trade costs are smaller, 
compared to inter-regional trade costs, due to inter-regional barriers. For instance, 
in Canada, we observe several inter-provincial trade barriers leading to a 
fragmented market. Indeed, provincial governments implement some inter-
provincial barriers so that their local economy is preserved from the state 
competition. Moreover, according to Zadorozhniy (2002) quoted by Daumal 
(2008), inter-regional barriers mainly in agricultural trade are more and more 
important in the Russian Federation. 
 
Hypothesis 2. Separatist regions of federal states promote international trade. 
This hypothesis is built on results derived by Alesina et al. (2000) and express that 
minority regions have an advantage by creating new small jurisdictions under free 
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trade. Since trade openness decreases the cost of secession and of being a small 
state, secessionist regions have an advantage to be in favour of low trade barriers. 
The author argues that secessionist regions in most federal countries (Canada, 
Austria, Ethiopia etc.) are entitled either to secede or to have more autonomy 
peacefully. These regions lead a secessionist strategy with the aim of reducing the 
economic cost of secession. Thus, more integration with international trade (that 
diminishes the dependence to national economy and the cost of secession) seems 
to be an important aspect for secessionist groups. In addition, subnational 
jurisdictions enjoy a degree of autonomy regarding implementing laws or 
taxation. Thus, according to Daumal (2008), separatist regions have the possibility 
to strengthen the trade globalisation system8. For instance, in Quebec, some 
parties attempts to implement a free trade agreement between the US and Quebec 
(this agreement was refused by the US), in order to increase their autonomy from 
the Canadian market. According to Paquin (2004) quoted by Daumel (2008), 
yesteryear, Flemish parties in Belgium highly bear trade liberalization and the 
European common market, in order to promote independence.  
 
Methodology and variables 
The author analyses a panel data of 148 states, from 1980 to 2002, based on a 
gravity model coming from Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) theory. These 
authors argue that the conventional gravity equation is not correctly specified, as 
it does not consider multilateral trade-resistance. The idea is that two states, 
surrounded by other big trading economies, will trade less between themselves 
than if they were encircled by oceans or deserts. The gravity equation is the 
following: 
 ln𝑋!"# =   𝛽! + 𝛽! ln 𝐺𝐷𝑃!" +   𝛽! 𝐺𝐷𝑃!" +   𝛽! 𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒!"# + 𝛽!   𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒!" +  𝛽!   𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑔𝑒!" +   𝛽!   𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟!" + 𝛽!   𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑚! +   𝛽! 𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑚! +   𝜆! +𝐹𝐸!" + 𝑢!"#  (3.4) 
                                                
 
 
8 See Hillman (2005) for an opposite hypothesis concerning the relation between separatism and 
international trade. 
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where the dependent variable represents the exports from state i to j for year t (US 
dollars). Notice that i represents the exporting state, while j the importing state. 
Then, the explanatory variables are represented by (i) gross national product of 
country i for year t, (ii) gross national product of country j for year t, (iii) the 
bilateral exchange rate between state i and j for year t, (iv) the bilateral distance 
between the two main considerable cities of the states, (v) a dummy variable 
taking the value 1, if states i and j share a common border, otherwise 0, (vi) a 
dummy variable taking the value 1, if states i and j share a common language, 
otherwise 0, (vii) a dummy variable taking the value 1, if state i is a federal state, 
otherwise 0, and finally, (viii) a dummy variable that take the value 1, if state j is 
a federal state, otherwise 0. The last two terms of the equation represent 
respectively, time dummies (control all events limited to year t and widespread to 
all states), and random bilateral effect. 
 
Two remarks have to be notified. Firstly the author uses random effect instead of 
fixed effect, because it considers the fact that error terms are not correlated with 
independent variables. Thus, it is possible to use time-invariant variables as 
explanatory variables. However, it can result from the random effect some bias 
(correlation between independent variables and bilateral effect). Daumal (2008) 
argues that federalism and separatist variables have a small probability to be 
correlated with bilateral effects. Therefore, they coefficient can be interpreted.  
 
Secondly, a great number of bilateral trade flows are equivalent to zero. However, 
these zeros may include important information. In consequence, in order to 
perform the gravity equation (3.3), the author employs the poisson maximum 
likelihood estimator. “This method is a good alternative to include the zero values 
of the dependent variable since it consists of estimating the bilateral trade 𝑋!" in 
levels” (Daumal, 2008). Indeed, this method is applicable to the level of trade and, 
therefore, estimating directly the non-linear form of the gravity model, and avert a 
value of zero, concerning trade flows.  
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Results 
The author encounters some trouble to test empirically hypothesis 1 because of a 
lack of data on market fragmentation. Nonetheless, the hypothesis 2 can be tested 
successfully, so the results of federalism and separatism on international trade, are 
estimated. Table 3.4 presents the panel data estimation that captures the impact of 
federalism and separatism on foreign trade.  
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All values in Column 1 correspond to what the existing literature have already 
found about this topic. Indeed, gross national product of the both states are 
roughly one, a decrease in bilateral distance between two states increases the 
exports from i to j, common border and common language have a positive impact 
on bilateral trade, and a slight appreciation of the exchange rate (coefficient of -
0,004) increases bilateral trade. Regarding the principal variable, federalism, the 
author finds a surprising result (the expected sign of federalism is positive). 
Indeed, the coefficient (-0,67) is negative and significant at 1 per cent and 
signifies that federalism in state i has a negative impact on international trade. 
Federalism in state j has a positive impact on their importations. Neglected 
variables explaining foreign trade and correlated with federalism, is an 
explanation of the negative sign of federalism and, thus, can insert some bias in 
the coefficients of federalism.  
 
Consequently, the author wants to control the factors of trade that may be 
correlated with federalism in order to find a correct coefficient of federalism. The 
author adds, respectively, in column 2 and 3, the variables democracy and 
population, because they have an impact on international trade. In consequence, 
the coefficients are different. Indeed, Federalismi is now positive and equivalent 
to 0,90 and Federalismj is positive and greater than before. Recall that Federalismi 
before controlling democracy and population had a negative sign. A first result 
can now be obtained. A federal system has a positive effect on international trade.  
 
In order to find more robust evidence, the author includes another factor 
correlated with federalism. Thereby, in order to test the second hypothesis, she 
adds a variable concerning separatism. By using, for the data, a university project 
that controls “the status of politically-active minority groups” in all states (MAR 
project), thus establishing a list of separatist movements. The dummy variable 
Separatismi takes the value 1, if we find at least one active separatist region (it 
means coded at level three in the MAR data set) in state i in 1980, otherwise 0. 
This variable is built from 1980 only, so as to control the endogeneity problem.  
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In consequence, the author adds the dummy variable explained before in column 
4. The coefficient associated with Separatismi,j take a positive value (1,77 and 
1,29). This leads to the second result, active separatist regions impact 
international trade, whatever be the political system. Moreover, in other 
robustness checks, Daumal (2008) decomposes the separatism variable into four 
interactions, in order to test if separatist regions in federal states or unitary states 
have an effect on international trade. The four interactions terms are presented as 
follows. “Federalismi x Separatismi” and “Federalismj x Separatismj” describe the 
effect of separatist regions in federal country on international trade. “Unitaryi x 
Separatismi” and “Unitaryj x Separatismj” describe the effect of separatist regions 
in unitary country on international trade. This leads to the third result, all the 
coefficients of the four interactions are positive and significantly different from 
zero. Furthermore, separatism in unitary states has a bigger effect on international 
trade than separatism in federal states (coefficient linked to federalism represent 
0,43 and 0,81 and are lower than coefficient linked to unitary state which are 1,95 
and 1,29). 
 
In a nutshell, several economists argue that economic integration may involve 
political disintegration. Daumal (2008) finds, empirically, that federalism enhance 
international trade. In consequence, these two forces (federalism and economic 
globalization) reinforce each other and, thus, should influence the world in the 
time to come. Moreover, the author tests, empirically, the effect of separatist 
regions on international trade, and suggests that whatever the system (federalism, 
unitary), separatism has a positive impact on international trade.  
 
3.3 The impact of decentralisation and federalism on borders 
stability 
 
The question whether central government can keep subnational jurisdictions 
together, using decentralization or sharing power (with the regions) is important. 
There are a few arguments in support or against the stabilizing capacity of 
federalism and decentralization. In this last section, I will deal with an empirical 
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analysis related with the link between decentralisation, federalism and borders 
stability. Indeed, this section proposes an analysis of Bakke and Wibbels (2006) 
where they assess the relation between decentralization and three different levels 
of ethnic conflict (leading to secession).  
 
3.3.1 The relation between decentralization and ethnic conflict 
  
Bakke and Wibbels (2006) try to evaluate, in an interesting manner, the 
relationship between decentralization and ethnic conflict, by concentrating on 
differences across federal nations. They run a regression with three different 
levels of ethnic conflict (from violent to non-violent) with interactive explanatory 
variables and control (non-federal) variables. Moreover, they use graphics (due to 
some problem of interpretation) to show how the interactive variables have an 
effect on ethnic conflict.  
 
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1. The interaction between regionally concentrated ethnic groups and 
high interregional income inequality leads to conflict. 
A wide body of literature exists which argues that ethnicity leads to conflict due 
to emotions like hatred or resentment over differences from others. On the other 
hand, arguments say that difference in resources or wealth may lead to 
disagreement. Indeed, richer regions may have to transfer their wealth to the rest 
of the country and, thus, hope of enhancing its conditions by escaping via 
secession. Poorer regions may want to secede in order to find better conditions 
regarding redistribution policy. The authors argue that both mechanisms often 
intersect.  
 
Hypothesis 2. The interaction between fiscal decentralization and interregional 
inequality leads to conflict. 
The authors argue that fiscal decentralisation may intensify interregional 
inequalities. Firstly, the central government has less capacity to engage in a 
redistributive policy from richer regions to poorer ones, because the sub-national 
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jurisdictions use a greater share of the public budget. Therefore, central 
government disposes less fiscal tools. Secondly, the authors assert that fiscal 
decentralisation is combined with a competition between regions regarding capital 
and that under some conditions can increase inequalities. Indeed, poorer regions 
may have some low potential to engage in capital bargaining against richer 
regions. As a consequence, with high interregional inequality, fiscal 
decentralisation will increase inequality and, thus, lead to conflict.  
 
Hypothesis 3. The interaction of large federal fiscal transfers and regionally 
concentrated ethnic groups diminishes conflict. 
Fiscal federalism and conflict literature highlight the presence of fiscal transfers 
for moderating interregional conflict. The authors expect that fiscal transfers, 
conditioned by the ethnic composition of the population, promote peace.  
 
Hypothesis 4. The interaction of national parties and the incorporation of ethnic 
minorities within those parties diminishes conflict. 
The authors argue that inclusive national party systems supports federation from 
fragmenting into conflicting regions. On the other hand, Brancati (2006) proposes 
that regional parties exacerbate conflict by making stronger the separatist 
identities and, thus, mobilizing groups to attempt a secession process. Legislation 
regarding main characteristics of decentralized governance often fail to consider 
the minorities. In contrast, when ethnic minorities are taken into account in 
national governing coalitions, this detracts conflict.  
 
Methodology and variables 
In order to test the hypotheses above, the authors carry out a time-series, cross-
sectional analysis of conflict in 22 federal nations9 (or semi-federal) from 1978 to 
2000. Their goal is not to describe the difference between a federal system and a 
unitary system, but to know how federal nations have an effect on the probability 
                                                
 
 
9 Countries concerned are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, 
Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, germany, India, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, the Soviet 
Union, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, the US, Venezuela and Yugoslavia. 
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of separatist conflict. Moreover, they add several federal variables (ethnic regional 
concentration, interregional inequality, fiscal decentralisation, and central 
governments grants, etc.) and multiplicative terms, in order to catch the 
conditional relationships in the hypotheses.  
 
Regarding the first hypothesis, the authors use the share of a state’s population 
living in ethnic regions (determined by race, language and religions) for 
regionally concentrated ethnic groups. Moreover, they distinguish ethnic majority 
(the half of the residents at least belong to the ethnic groups) and minority 
regions. The interregional income inequality is represented by per capita regional 
GDP. For a country-year, the authors compute the income of the first 10 richest 
percentile divided by the income of the last 10 poorest percentile. Regarding the 
second hypothesis, the authors calculate the fiscal decentralization as the share of 
entire public sector spending at the local level, and count on IMF’s Government 
Finance Statistics. Furthermore, the measure of interregional inequality is the 
same as the first hypothesis described above. Then, regarding the third hypothesis, 
the authors calculate fiscal transfers as the share of entire public sector that is 
concerned by federal grants or shared revenues. Finally, for the last hypothesis, 
the authors regroup regional and national data election results, in order to create a 
variable that “measures the share of regional governments controlled by the 
nationally governing party of coalition” (Bakke and Wibbels, 2006). In addition, 
the authors lag the calculation of both fiscal decentralization and fiscal transfers 
coming from the central government, because they do not anticipate that 
institutions have an impact on conflict.  
 
Furthermore, they add other variables affecting conflicts in federal nations 
(control variables or non-federal variables). Indeed, first, a variable of per capita 
income representing the economic strength of the nation is added in the 
regression, because nations that are economically advanced (thus have strong 
capacities regarding financial, police, administrative or military) can reduce 
conflict. Second, in a similar way, they add a variable denoting the size of the 
nation’s population. Third, they add a dummy variable representing oil exporters. 
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It can linked to conflict if the oil resources, in federal nations, is mainly clustered 
in one or two regions and central government wants to use the revenues generated 
in order to redistribute it within the nation. Fourth, they add a variable of 
democracies. It face less conflict compared to authoritarian nations. Finally, they 
add lagged dependent variable in order to control what happened the year before 
(more precisely, they want to take into account anterior conflict).  
 
Moreover, in order to solve the problem of causality, they do not add all of the 
variables that are times significant (political instability, non-contiguous territory 
etc.) 
 
Concerning the dependent variable, they use three calculations that measure 
different level of separatism conflict. Indeed, the first one represents armed 
conflict as violent encounter. The second one represent ethnic rebellion as 
political banditry to extended civil war. Finally, the last dependent variable is 
ethnic protest as groups showing non-violent protest action (verbal opposition or 
manifestation). In order to find the impact of the independent variables on the 
three dependent variables, the authors run Logit regression.  
 
A technical point is that the interaction between two variables can be expressed as 
the effect of one independent variable, depending on the level of the other 
independent variable. The relationship between the two independent variables and 
how they simultaneously influence the dependent variable, is not additive and, 
thus, pose some problems in interpretation. As a consequence, the authors employ 
graphs to show the effect of the conditional hypotheses on conflict.  
 
Results 
Table 3.5 presents the results of the three regressions with the three different 
dependent variables (armed conflict, ethnic rebellion, and ethnic protest). 
Regarding the control variables (or non-federal variables), as expected, GDP per 
capita tend to decrease the probability of ethnic rebellion and ethnic protest. States 
with large population appear to increase the probability of conflict. The result for 
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democracy has no significant results and, thus, no effect on conflict. Country 
exporting oil seems to reduce the probability of ethnic rebellions compared to 
country without such resources.  
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Concerning the federal variables, the authors find preliminary evidence on each of 
the hypotheses. However, interpreting the coefficient of variables with conditional 
relationships may pose some problem.  
 
Furthermore, the authors argue that a multicollinearity problem may arise. 
Therefore, they show the effect of the four interactive hypotheses by graphs. They 
establish one constitutive variable constant at two extreme values, as low and high 
(one standard deviation below or above the sample mean). It interacts on the level 
of the other constitutive variable. This leads to create predicted values based on 
results of Table 3.5. Moreover, the dashed line represents the confidence interval 
at 90 per cent. In a more intuitive manner, the graphs present how the interaction 
of the variables have an effect on conflict.  
 
• The authors find evidence regarding hypothesis 1. Indeed, Graph 3.1 
shows that with high regional ethnic concentration, the probability of 
ethnic rebellion increases as interregional inequality rises. Rich majority 
or minority want to avoid a redistributive policy, or poor majority or 
minority “may feel a strong sense of grievance” (Bakke and Wibbels, 
2006). However, with low regional ethnic concentration, the probability of 
conflict is near zero, when interregional inequality is high.  
Source: Bakke and Wibbels (2006) 
Graph 3.6 – The impact of interregional inequality on ethnic rebellion, 
conditional on ethnic concentration 
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• The authors find evidence regarding hypothesis 2. Indeed, Graph 3.2 
shows that with high or low interregional inequality, the probability of 
ethnic rebellion increases drastically as fiscal decentralization rises. 
Surprisingly, fiscal decentralisation seems to have no clear moderate 
impact in states with low interregional inequality. 
 
Source: Bakke and Wibbels (2006) 
Graph 3.7 – The impact of fiscal decentralisation on ethnic rebellion, conditional 
on interregional inequality 
 
 
• The authors find no clear evidence for hypothesis 3. Indeed, there is no 
support for a diminution of armed conflict and ethnic rebellion with the 
interaction of fiscal transfers and central government grants 
 
• Finally, the authors find strong evidence for hypothesis 4. Indeed, Graph 
3.3 shows that with ethnic regions that are not copartisans of the centre, 
the probability of ethnic protest increases as general copartisanship rises. 
In other words, the probability of ethnic protest increases when ethnic 
groups are not taken into account in the national parties, or ethnic groups 
are present in an opposition party. Moreover, if ethnic regions are 
considered in the nationally governing party, the probability of ethnic 
conflict decreases as copartisanship increases.  
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Source: Bakke and Wibbels (2006) 
Graph 3.8 – The impact of copartisanship on ethnic protest, conditional on ethnic 
copartisanship 
 
 
To sum up, Bakker and Wibbels (2006) proposes an interesting way to evaluate 
the relation between decentralization and ethnic conflict, leading to separatism. 
One of their results shows that fiscal decentralisation increase ethnic conflict 
when there are inequalities between regions. This coincides with the fact that 
heterogeneity of preference and difference in income may lead to borders 
instability and may counterbalance the positive effect of decentralization. 
Nevertheless, this does not suggest that government has to give up 
decentralization, but rather put more emphasize on the need of more 
decentralization.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
The purpose of this thesis was to highlight, from a theoretical and an empirical 
point of view, the economic factors affecting the probability of secession at 
national or sub-national level.  
 
From a theoretical point of view, I used the model of Alesina and Spolaore as a 
benchmark case. The authors investigated how the advantages and costs from size 
and heterogeneity have an effect on the formation and breaking up of countries. 
They considered several economic perspectives on endogenous borders.  
 
In the first phase, they defined the arrangement of boundaries in an ideal world 
where the number and size of states result from a maximization of the difference 
between the total benefits and total costs. This led to the optimal number of states 
where borders are efficient. This efficiency analysis of boundaries was an 
indispensable step to evaluate how far from that optimal benchmark actual 
political borders may be arranged. Indeed, actual boundaries are established 
through imperfect mechanisms and, therefore, may lead to inefficiencies.  
 
In the second phase, they analysed the arrangement of boundaries when 
individuals have the possibility to choose democratically whether to be part of a 
greater political union or to secede from an existing states. They found that voters 
far away from the government endure more heterogeneity costs from living in a 
large state and, thus, have a preference to create smaller and more homogenous 
states. Nevertheless, secession led to inefficiencies because the sum of the 
individuals’ utilities is lower. This necessitates mentioning aspect. The presence 
of compensations scheme may change voters’ behaviour and have an effect on the 
stability of boundaries. Though, the authors argued that these transfers might be 
difficult to implement. In addition, they analysed the impact of economic 
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integration on the equilibrium number of states and found that greater economic 
integration imply smaller states, and smaller states will require more economic 
integration.  
 
In the third phase, they defined a configuration of boundaries when Leviathans 
rule the world. Leviathan can be seen as monarchs, dictators or colonial powers 
where their aim is to maximize the size of the government. These rulers, less 
concerned with the utilities of the individuals, may follow expansionary policies 
leading to the creation of inefficiently large states or empires. Furthermore, these 
processes imply, in many cases, the use of violence or conflict. 
 
At the end of the theoretical chapter, we relaxed several assumptions and 
presented some extensions of the seminal model. The model of Bolton and Roland 
(1997) was characterised by exogenous borders, in order to avoid a purely 
symmetric world representation and matching more the reality. Moreover, they 
considered the heterogeneity, in terms of difference in income, and, thus, 
preferences over policies might lead to secession. They found that redistribution 
regarding the income had three distinct effects on the desire to make secession: a 
political effect, an efficiency effect, and a tax-base effect. Moreover, when the 
authors considered perfect factor mobility, the tax rate was the same and the union 
held (always preferred than secession).  
 
From an empirical point of view, I exposed several empirical analyses of 
economic determinants affecting the probability of secession. First, Alesina, 
Baquir and Hoxby (2004) tested the basic trade-off between heterogeneity and 
economies of scales using counties data in the US. They found that counties, 
affected by the black migration, had more School Districts after World Wars I and 
II. In other words, their most important finding was that racial heterogeneity 
increases the number of School Districts. Second, regarding the link between 
economic globalization and secessions, the results were mixed. Indeed, Sorens 
(2004) found relevant support that secessionist growth is fuelled by globalization, 
but only in regions that already possess secessionist parties. However, the author 
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limited the term of economic globalisation. He did not consider the financial 
integration in his analysis but simplified the term of economic globalisation as the 
international trade between two countries. In addition, he demonstrated that 
secessionist regions have a greater likelihood to receive more autonomy that non 
secessionist-regions. Then, Daumal (2008) found interesting results where 
secessionist regions in federal states foster international trade and, therefore, 
decrease the reliance to trade within the national economy. Finally, Bakke and 
Wibbels (2006) tried to show a relation between decentralisation and federalism, 
and ethnic conflict. They found that fiscal decentralization within federal states is 
combined with more ethnic conflict when there is high inequality between 
regions.  
 
According to the fact and studies described in this thesis, economic determinants 
are important in secession process. The literature regarding the size of nations has 
already considered several economic variables affecting countries borders. 
Nevertheless, important dimensions, such as technological progress, the decrease 
in communication and transport costs or the size of firms can be integrated in 
order to have a full understanding of the economic factors of the size of countries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
61 
Bibliography 
 
Alesina A. and Spolaore E. (1997), “On the number and size of nation”, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 112(4), pp. 1027-1056. 
 
Alesina A. and Spolaore E. (2003), The size of nations, The MIT Press, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England.  
 
Alesina A., Baquir R. and Hoxby C. (2004), “Political jurisdictions in 
heterogeneous communities”, Journal of Political Economy, 112(2). 
 
Alesina A., Spolaore E. and Wacziarg R. (2000), “Economic Integration and 
Political Disintegration “, American Economic Review, 90(5), pp. 1276-1296. 
 
Anderson J. A. (1982) Logistic regression, Handbook of Statistics, North-
Holland, New York, pp. 169-191. 
 
Anderson J. A. and van Wincoop E. (2003), “Gravity with gravitas: a solution to 
the border puzzle”, American Economic Review 93, pp. 170-192. 
 
Bakke K.M. and Wibbels E. (2006), “Diversity, disparity, and civil conflict in 
federal states”, Worlds Politics, 59 (October), pp. 1-50. 
 
Barro R. J. (1991), “Small is Beautiful”, The Wall Street Journal, October 11. 
 
Berkowitz D. (1997), “Regional income and secession: Center-periphery relations 
in emerging market economies”, Regional Science and Urban Economics, 27(1), 
pp. 17-45. 
 
Bolton P. and Roland G. (1997), “The break-up of nations: a political economy 
analysis”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(4), pp. 1057-90. 
 
Boniface P. (1998), “The proliferation of states”, The Washington Quarterly, 
21(3), pp. 109-127. 
 
Bookman M. (1993), The economics of Secession, New York, St. Martin Press. 
 
Boulenger S., Gauthier I. and Vaillancourt F. (2012), “Déconcentration, 
delegation et devolution: avantages, inconvévients et mise en place”, Cirano 
Working Papers.  
 
Brancati D. (2006), “Decentralization: Fueling the Fire or Dampening the Flames 
of Ethnic Conflict and Secessionism?”, International Organization, 60, pp. 651-
685. 
 
 
 
 
62 
Buchanan J. M. and Faith R. L. (1987), “Secession and the limits of taxation: 
towards a theory of internal exit”, American Economic Review, 77(5), pp. 1023-
1031. 
 
Casella A. (1992), “On Markets and Clubs Economic and Political Integration of 
Regions with Unequal Productivity”, American Economic Review, Papers and 
Proceedings, LXXXII, pp. 115-21. 
 
Casella A. (2001), “The role of market size in the formation of jurisdictions”, 
Review of Economic Studies, 68(1), pp. 83-108. 
 
Casella A. and Feinstein J. (1990), “Public Goods in Trade On the Formation of 
Market and Political Jurisdictions”, NBER Working paper No 3554, December.  
 
Casella A. and Feinstein J. S. (2002), “Public Goods in Trade on the Formation of 
Markets and Jurisdictions”, International Economic Review, 43(2), pp. 437-462. 
 
Cheikbossian G. (2001), L’économie politique de l’éclatement des Unions 
économiques, edition L’Harmattan, Paris, France. 
 
Coeuré B., Rabaud I. and Madiès T. (2003), “Attractivité de la France : analyse, 
perception et mesure ; suivi d'un commentaire de Thierry Madiès”, Economie et 
statistique, N°363-365, Les entreprises sur les marchés mondiaux, pp. 97-127. 
 
Dabla-Norris E. and Weber S. (2000), “Regional Disparities and Transfer Policies 
in Russia: Theory and Evidence”, IMF Discussion paper. 
 
Dafflon B. (2010), “Financial Federalism and Decentralisation”, Cours de 
fédéralisme financier et decentralisation, SA.  
 
Dafflon B. and Madiès T. (2008), “Décentralisation: quelques Principes Issus de 
la théorie du fédéralisme financier”, Notes et Documents, no.42, Agence 
Française de Développement, Paris, 112 pages.  
 
Daumal M. (2008), “Federalism, separatism and international trade”, European 
Journal of Political Economy, 24, pp. 675-687. 
 
Deiwiks C., Cederman L-E. and Gleditsch K.S. (2012), “Inequality and conflict in 
federations”, Journal of Peace Research, 49(2), pp. 289-304. 
 
Dion S. (1995), “The re-emergence of secessionism: Lessons from Quebec”, in A.  
Breton, G. Galeotti, P. Salmon and R. Wintrobe (ed.), Nationalism and 
rationalism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 116-142. 
 
Drèze J. (1993), “Regions of Europe: a feasible status, to be discussed”, 
Economic Policy, 8(17), pp. 265-287. 
 
 
 
 
63 
Faini R., Galli G., Gennari P., and Rossi F. (1997), “An empirical puzzle: falling 
migration and growing unemployment differentials among Italian regions”, 
European Economic Review, 41(3-5), pp. 571-579. 
 
Fearson D. (2003), “Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country”, Journal of 
Economic Growth, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 195-222. 
 
Feenstra R. (2002), “Border effects and the gravity equation: consistent methods 
for estimation”, Scottish Journal of Political Economy 49, pp. 491-506. 
 
Friedman D. (1997), “A theory of the size and shape of nations”, Journal of 
Political Economy, 85, pp. 59-77. 
 
Hillman A.L. (2005), “Political institutions, jurisdictional boundaries, and rent 
creation”, Keio Economic Studies 42, pp. 25-37. 
 
Hochman O., Pines D. and Thisse J.-F. (1995), “On the optimal structure of local 
governments”, American Economic Review, 85(5), pp. 1224-1240.  
 
Inman R. and Rubinfeld D. L. (2005), “Federalism and the democratic transition: 
lessons from South Africa”, American Economic Review, 95(2), 39-43. 
 
Le Breton M. and Weber S. (2003), “The Art ok making everybody happy: how to 
prevent a secession”, IMF Staff Papers, 50(3), pp. 403-435. 
 
Leite-Monteiro M. and Sato M. (2003), “Economic integration and fiscal 
devolution”, Journal of Public Economics, 87(11), pp. 2507-2525. 
 
Long J.S. (1997), “Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent 
Variables”, Advanced Quantitatives Techniques in the Social Sciences Number 7, 
Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA. 
 
Mayer T. (2001), “Les frontiers nationales comptent mais de moins en moins”, La 
lettre du Centre d’études prospectives et d’information internationals, Paris, 
France. 
 
Musgrave R.A. (1997), “Devolution, grants and fiscal competition”, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 11, pp. 65-72. 
 
Paquin S. (2004), “Paradiplomatie et Relations Internationales: Théories des 
Stratégies Internationales des Régions face à la Mondialisation”, Presses 
Interuniversitaires Europeennes, Bruxelles. 
 
Portes R. and Rey H. (2000), “the determinants of cross-borders equity flows”, 
GEP Discussion Papers 446, London School of Economics. 
 
 
 
 
64 
Rosière S. (2010), “La fragmentation de l’espace étatique mondial”, L’Espace 
Politique, Département de géographie de l’Université de Reims Champagne-
Ardenne.  
 
Rota Graziosi G. (2001), “Une analyse économique de la secession”, Recherches 
Economiques de Louvain, 67(3), pp. 315-348. 
 
Rota Graziosi G. (2004), “La fragmentation politique, une revue de la littérature”, 
Revue Française d’Economie, Programme National Persée, vol. 18(4), pages 193-
223. 
 
Rota Graziosi G. (2006), “Economic integration and political fragmentation”, 
Working Papers 200628, CERDI, Université d’Auvergne, France.  
 
Saiegh S. M. and Tommasi M. (1999), “Why is Argentina’s fiscal federalism so 
inefficient? Entering the labyrinth”, Journal of Applied Economics, vol.0, pp. 
169-209. 
 
Sorens J. (2004), “Globalization, secessionism, and autonomy”, Department of 
Political Science, Yale University, Electoral Studies 23, pp. 727-752. 
 
Spiller P. and Tommasi M. (2003), “The institutional foundations of pubic policy: 
a transactions approach with application to Argentina”, Journal of Law, 
Economics and Organisation, 19(2), pp. 281-306. 
 
Spolaore E. (2008), “Federalism, regional distribution, and country stability”, 
Discussion Papers Series 0726, Department of Economics, Tufts University. 
 
Spolaore E. (2008), “The Efficieny and Stability of National Borders”, Vives 
discussion paper series 1, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Faculteit Economie en 
Bedrijfswetenschappen, Vives.  
 
Spolaore E. (2012), “The economics of political borders”, CESifo, Working 
Paper: Public Choice, No. 3854. 
 
Stock J.H. and Watson M.W. (2011), Introduction to Econometrics, 3rd edition, 
Boston: Pearson/Addison Wesley.  
 
Tétart F. (2010), “Les nationalismes régionaux en Europe, facteur de 
fragmentation spaciale ?”, L’Espace Politique, Département de géographie de 
l’Université de Reims Champagne-Ardenne.  
 
 
Tiebout C.M. (1956), “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures”, The Journal of 
Political Economy, 64(5), pp. 416-424. 
 
Tobin J. (1958), “Estimation of Relationships for Limited Dependent Variables”, 
Econometrica, Vol 26, No. 1, pp. 24-36 
 
 
 
65 
 
World Trade Organisation and United Nations (2012), A Practical Guide to Trade 
Policy Analysis, Geneva, Switzerland.  
 
Yarbrough B. and Yarbrough R. (1998), “Unification and secession: group size 
and escape from lock.in”, KYKLOS, 51(2), pp. 171-195. 
 
Young R. (1995), “La secession du Québec et l’avenir du Canada”, Les Presses de 
l’Université Laval, Québec.  
 
Zadorozhniy G.E. (2002), “Russia’s WTO accession: Interregional barriers to 
agricultural trade in the Russian federation”, Monterey Institute of International 
Studies, Monterrey, California. 
 
